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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED( ON APPEAL 
The sole issue for decision in this appeal is whether 
the six-year statute of limitations contained in Utah's Product 
Liability Act (now declared unconstitutiohal) was the applicable 
period of limitation in which this action had to be brought. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a product liability action filed by plaintiff 
for damages resulting from the death of hi[s wife when their Saab 
automobile was destroyed in a fire. The action was filed over 
two years from the date of the accident, fc^ut less than six years 
from the date of sale of the automobile, Defendants filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment claiming the Wrongful death statute 
of limitations applied to the case and tide case should be dis-
missed. The trial court found that the product liability statute 
was the more specific statute and was therefore applicable to 
this cause of action allowing plaintiff six years from the date 
of sale of the automobile in which to file £n action. Subsequent 
to this court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 
Utah P.2d 670 (1985), wherein the product liability act was found 
to be unconstitutional, defendants renewed their Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, claiming the Product Liability Act statute of 
limitations was void ab initio due to the ^ct's unconstitution-
ality. As such, defendants argued that the Wrongful death statute 
of limitations was applicable and that pllaintiff s action was 
thereby barred. The trial court granted defendants' final Motion 
for Summary Judgment and plaintiff has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ronda M. Luther Raithaus died on July 2, 1979 from 
injuries sustained when the Saab automobile she and her husband 
Dr. Larry Raithaus were traveling in, burst into flames after 
driving off the paved highway in Little Cottonwood Canyon, R. 
3-4. The Complaint in this action was filed on November 29, 
1982, claiming damages for the death of Ronda M. Luther Raithaus, 
plaintiff's wife, R* 6. The Saab automobile in question was a 
1976 model, R.3, bought by Dr. Raithaus in February of 1977, R. 
30, 64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is plaintiff's position that the statute of limita-
tions in the Utah Product Liability Act was the appropriate sta-
tute of limitations at the time this action was filed and became 
a component of plaintiff's vested cause of action. The void ab 
initio doctrine applied to unconstitutional statutes should not 
apply so as to deprive plaintiff of this cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF HAD A VESTED RIGHT TO COMMENCE A PRODUCT LIABILITY 
ACTION FOR THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY, 1983 AND 
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL ACTS CANNOT ARBITRARILY DIVEST THAT RIGHT. 
The trial court in this case made rulings based upon 
the applicaDility of certain statutes of limitations in this 
action. In the first ruling Judge Leary denied defendants7 motion 
for judgment on the pleading holding the product liability statute 
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applied. In the second ruling, Judge Billings held that the 
Utah Product Liability Act statute of limitations requiring that 
any product liability action be brought within six years of the 
date of the sale of a product or ten year^ from its date of manu-
facture, was applicable to this case rather than the Utah Wrongful 
Death statutes two year limitation, R. 50-£2. in the third ruling 
Judge Rokich, dismissed plaintiff's Complaint based on defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
By finally granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court clearly adopted defendants' position 
that under the void ab initio doctrine, this court's decision 
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, Ut&h 717 P. 2d 670, erased 
the Utah Product Liability Act from the statute books as though 
it had never existed. Defendants' cited £ases such as Malan v. 
Lewis, Utah 639 P.2d, 661 (1984) concluding that an unconstitu-
tional statute can neither confer nor take away the rights of 
individuals. The difficulty with this teasoning is it stops 
short of a logical and thorough analysis of the issues in this 
case. It is not sufficient to say an unconstitutional statute 
can neither confer nor take away individual rights. Clearly, 
this court in its Berry decision did not anticipate an absolute 
adherence to the void ab initio doctrine Would result in a con-
struction of Berry that would abrogate individual rights and 
causes of action, in the same way as the ^erry court criticized 
the legislature for doing. It is plaintiff's position that such 
was not the intent of this court in Berry and a proper analysis 
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will result in this court overturning the lower court,s Summary 
Judgment• 
The plaintiff Dr. Raithaus had a vested right in a 
strict liability cause of action for the death of his wife due 
to a product defect in their Saab automobile. The cause of action 
against a manufacturer for damages resulting from a defective 
product is a common law cause of action. See Hahn v. Armcor 
Steel Company, Utah, 601 P.2d 152 (1979). In addition to the 
elements of the cause of action as defined under the common law, 
an important component of Dr. Raithaus's vested right was the 
statutory limitation period found in Utah's Product Liability 
Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-15-3 (1953) which provided: 
No action shall be brought for the recovery 
of damages for personal injury, death or 
damaged property more than six years after 
the date of initial purchase for use or con-
sumption, or ten years after the date of 
manufacture of a product where that action 
is based or arises out of . . . (b) defects 
in design, inspection, testing or manufacture; 
. • . (e) any other alleged defect or failure 
of whatsoever kind or nature in relation to 
a product. 
This statutory provision contained a specific limitation in pro-
duct liability actions separate and apart from the general statute 
of four years covering personal injuries, Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 78-12-25 see Appendix A and the general statute governing wrong-
ful death, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-28. See Appendix B. In 
the instant case the effect of the Product Liability Act was to 
extend Dr. Raithaus's period of limitation. The automobile he 
claims as defective was first sold in February of 1977 allowing 
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him until February 1983 to file a product liability cause of 
action. The action was filed in November 1982. 
This court in Berry analyzed th^ above statute of lim-
itations from its repose aspect, i.e., it^ s arbitrary abrogation 
of causes of action because of the unrelated nature of the date 
of sale or date of manufacturer. In Berr^ this court also found 
the Act not to be severable and therefor^, declared the entire 
act unconstitutional because it arbitrarily deprived individuals 
of their rights in violation of Utah's open courts constitutional 
provision, Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 11. In making that 
finding, this court made an important statement regarding the 
effect of Art. 1, § 11: 
A plain reading of § 11, however,) also estab-
lishes that framers of the constitution in-
tended that an individual could not be arbi-
trarily deprived of effective remedies de-
signed to protect basic individual rights. 
A constitutional guarantee of access to the 
courthouse was not intended by the founders 
to be an empty gesture; individuals are also 
entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" 
for injuries to "person, property), or reputa-
tion." 
(Supra at 675)(footnote omitted). Little <^ id this court realize 
a lower court would apply the void ab initio doctrine to the 
unconstitutional statute without recognizilng the clear need for 
exceptions. The result arbitrarily deprive|s Dr. Raithaus of his 
rights to an effective remedy without providing an alternative. 
This court in Berry went one step further in emphasizing the 
importance of careful analysis when it staged: 
. . . once a cause of action under a par-
ticular rule of law accrues to a person by 
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virtue of an injury to his rights, that per-
son's interest in the cause of action and 
the law which is the basis for a legal action 
becomes vested, and a legislative repeal of 
the law cannot constitutionally divest the 
injured person of the right to litigate the 
cause of action to a judgment. 
Supra at 676 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). It is diffi-
cult to believe that the constitution would place a limit on 
the legislature against divesting individuals of their rights and 
not place the same limitation on the judiciary. It is plaintiff's 
position that a judicial repeal of an unconstitutional statute 
of limitations which does not allow a reasonable period for those 
with an underlying vested cause of action to assert the action 
cannot be constitutionally valid. 
The trial court completely missed the underlying policy 
in this court's Berry decision. The clear policy of Berry was 
that individuals had to be allowed a reasonable time to assert 
their rights in the courts of this state and the repose nature 
of the Product Liability Act's statute of limitations clearly 
denied that reasonable time to many persons whose rights accrued 
after the repose period. This court clearly didn't anticipate 
that the statute itself also extended the period of time for 
certain individuals to file causes of action based on product 
liability. It is plaintiff's position that had this court real-
ized that Implication it would clearly have held that the extended 
period of time was a component of the vested and accrued legal 
right of parties who had been injured prior to the decision. 
The only case which plaintiff's counsel has been able 
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to find in which a court dealt with the subsequent application 
of a similiar judicially voided statute of limitations is McClure 
v, Middletown Hospital Association, 603 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ohio 
1985). The Ohio Supreme Court in Schwan V. Riverside Methodist 
Hospital, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983) found that the statute of 
limitations contained in the Ohio Medicai Malpractice Act pro-
viding different periods of limitation between minors under the 
age of 10 years and over the age of 10 year^ was unconstitutional. 
In a later decision, Opalko v. Marvmount Hospital, Inc., 458 
N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1984) the same court ih a rather convoluted 
decision determined that while its Schwan decision had found 
the distinction between minors under the ^ge of 10 and over the 
age of 10 to be impermissible, that decision did not strike down 
the absolute four year statute of limitations as applied to min-
ors. The Opalko court affirmed summary judgment for the defen-
dants because the plaintiff, a minor, had failed to bring an 
action within the absolute four year statute of limitations. 
The McClure court in a diversity action yas likewise asked to 
dismiss a malpractice claim brought under the Ohio medical mal-
practice Act prior to the Opalko decision. The defendant urged 
that because the court in Opalko had determined the absolute 
four year statute of limitations was applicable to minors and 
the fourteen year limitation previously provided for minors under 
the age of 10 had been declared unconstitutional, Sarah McClure 
had but four years from her birth (the datie of alleged injury) 
in which to bring a malpractice action. Tjhe McClure court de-
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clined to apply the Ohio Supreme Court cases retroactively and 
reasoned as follow: 
We do not believe that Sarah McClure's mal-
practice claim is barred by the absolute 
four year limitation enunciated in Opalko. 
This conclusion is based upon the inappro-
priateness of retroactive application of 
the Opalko decision and upon an exception 
to the rule that unconstitutional statutes 
are entitled6to no legal effect. 
The McClure court stated two reasons for not applying the Opalko 
decision retroactively: 
First the void ab initio doctrine 
does not apply to destroy contractual rights 
which have arisen or vested rights acquired 
under the prior state of the law. Sarah 
McClure's rights vested upon the existence 
of her right to sue, that is, upon her birth. 
At that time, § 2305.11(B) provided a 14-
year limitation on Sarah McClure's exercise 
of that right. The subsequent declaration 
of unconstitutionality cannot divest Sarah 
McClure of that right. 
The second reason that the void 
ab initio doctrine is inapplicable in this 
case is the peculiar nature of statutes of 
limitations. Such statutes derive their 
force by the mere fact of their enactment. 
They do not confer or extinguish substantive 
rights bat extinguish the remedy for violation 
of independent substantive rights. 
Id. at 1368-69 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The McClure court then concluded: 
Plaintiffs are not relying on un-
constitutional statutes for their creation 
of rights which would not have existed but 
for the enactment of unconstitutional statute. 
Rather, plaintiffs merely rely upon the arbi-
trary fixed interval for the assertion of 
previously existing rights as that fixed 
interval is written. The arbitrary fixed 
interval of fourteen years was initially 
set by the Ohio general assembly. That in-
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terval was thought to adequately protect 
the interests .of Ohio citizens. Sarah Mc-
Clure's action was brought well within that 
interval so that defendants Cannot claim 
surprise at being called upon |to defend a-
gainst her claim. 
Id. 
The McClure court relied on a earlier Ohio Supreme 
Court decision, Cook v. Matveis, 383 N.$.2d, 608 (Ohio 1978). 
The Cook court dealing with the applicable limitation period 
applied to a minor after the state had amended its age of minority 
from 21 to 18, held that an amended statute of limitation which 
totally obliterates an existing substantive right is unconstitu-
tional but an amended statute of limitation which provides a 
reasonable time in which the right may fce enforced after the 
amendment, can be constitutionally justified. The Cook court 
spent considerable effort debunking the m^th of a substantive/ 
procedural dichotomy in the application of retroactive statutes. 
The Cook court concluded that a remedy is not a remedy where 
there is not a reasonable time to enforce itj: and further held that 
the statutory limitation period on a cause of action is an impor-
tant substantive component of any cause o|f action. Certainly, 
application of judicial rules, whether Written or common law 
cannot be applied in contravention of constitutional guarantees 
or to arbitrarily deprive individuals of previously vested rights 
any more than legislative enactments can. In the instant case 
the defense is asking the judicial system tto abrogate Dr. Rait-
haus's previously vested right based on the decision in Berry. 
However, Berry instructed the legislature that under our state 
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constitution, the legislature did not have such authority. The 
irony of the defendants' reliance on Berry shows the absurdity 
of its position. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important that this court declare that while 
the Berry decision struck down Utah's Product Liability Act as 
unconstitutional and that Act is now void ab initio there is one 
important exception. For causes of action accruing prior to 
the Berry decision where the statute extended the time for filing 
an action based on product liability beyond either the two year 
wrongful death general statute of limitations or the four year 
tort general statute of limitations, the extended statute of 
limitations in the product liability act became a vested component 
of the accrued causes of action prior to this court's decision 
in Berry v. Beech and may be brought within that extended limi-
tation period. 
DATED this ^ C ^ day of June, 198 6. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Larry Raithaus, M.D.lll 
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